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In their introduction to Nudge (2008), Robert Thaler and Cass Sunstein outline how choice 
architecture can help decision-fatigued subjects make better decisions, according to their 
own criteria as to what a good decision might be. Yet they also acknowledge a fundamental 
problem that might arise as nudging becomes more ubiquitous: what measures would 
actually guarantee that choice architecture served the best interests of users or citizens, 
rather than those of advertisers, financiers or other privatized interests?  
 
Arguably, this problem has only been exacerbated by what Shoshana Zuboff has recently 
termed surveillance capitalism: a new regime of accumulation according to which Silicon 
Valley giants compete for dominance in surveillance assets, and broadly reimagine 
behavioural patterns as sites of direct intervention for profit. Corporations such as Google 
build advertising models that blend the “disinterested” language of searchability (of 
information, for the public good) with advertising keyword auctions based on surveillance of 
online users. As Safiya Noble points out, such blurring between conceptions of the “public 
good” and profitability can have serious ramifications for subjects’ self-perception.  
 
To develop an analysis of the politics of nudging within surveillance capitalism, this paper 
examines nudging toward reputation management on networking sites such as 
academia.edu and LinkedIn. These sites continually send automated notification emails, with 
prompts such as “Someone just searched you on Google,” to encourage users to 
rehabituate themselves as managers of their online reputations, who continually check their 
profiles. Such habits increase platforms’ profitability, by bulking out data streams used to 
generate advertising revenue, and increasing sites’ potential to gain subscription revenue for 
premium services. Yet they also promote a networked subjectivity amenable to – or even 
dependent on – reputation management, and create a “virtuous feedback loop” according to 
which the well-being of one’s networked self, via well-managed online reputation, is 
inextricably linked to the well-being of the for-profit platform.  
 
In online reputation management on surveillance capitalist platforms, the politics of nudging 
are deeply intertwined with the politics of online self-presentation. This makes it difficult to 
claim that surveillance-capitalist nudging reflects users’ the best interests. Rather, it actively 
constructs reputation-addicted subjectivities that suit the economic needs of the platform. 
 
 
 
